The Business Court’s docket is jammed full of disputes among entrepreneurs, joint venturers, and hopeful co-owners that go off the rails. Typically, counsel are along for each side to guide the dispute through litigation. In Law Off. of Ashley-Nicole Russell, P.A. v. McLawhorn Legal Servs. PLLC, 2026 NCBC 4, the Court faced an esquire-palooza. The litigants were lawyers and law firms, represented by lawyers and law firms, to resolve disputes about which lawyers and law firms could make claims against whom.

It all started peacefully enough, with attorneys Ashley-Nicole Russell and Benjamin McLawhorn operating separate family law practices and then also joining up to operate a third family law entity, McLawhorn & Russell, PLLC, in which they were equal owners. Russell and McLawhorn also formed an additional entity (Seagality) through which they purchased an office condominium from which M&R and Russell’s own firm were authorized to practice. Id. ¶¶ 8-12.

The dispute before Judge Robinson made it a hat trick of legal proceedings between Russell and McLawhorn about M&R’s operations. It followed an initial Wake County breach of contract action filed by Russell against McLawhorn and Seagality, and then an arbitration filed by Russell that advanced breaches of Seagality’s and M&R’s operating agreements. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.

The Court’s dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim served as a good reminder to consider asking for oral argument. A scheduled motion hearing in the case was cancelled because of a trial conflict for Plaintiffs’ counsel, and the Court elected to decide the matter on the papers under BCR 7.4 “[a]s no party has suggested in either the Motion or briefing that oral argument is necessary[.]” Id. ¶ 20.

It was a hard luck turn for the Plaintiffs, as the Court’s analysis of the Complaint and the briefs left it “unable to discern from the plain language of the allegations” whether the clients of Russell’s firm [ANR] – or M&R’s – had allegedly been interfered with. The Court interpreted the Complaint to raise a claim only on behalf of Russell’s ANR, but found that the brief filed by Russell and ANR only raised a claim for interference with M&R’s clients. Thus, the Court reasoned that the most basic element of a tortious interference claim was missing, where there wasn’t a contract at issue between a clearly defined plaintiff and a third party. Id. ¶ 38-39.

The Court found the Complaint didn’t adequately define whether Russell or her law firm was the “plaintiff” for purposes of an interference claim, so it decided that pleading the existence of “valid agreements with its clients” referred only to the clients of Russell’s law firm entity – ANR. Id. ¶ 38. But it’s a linguistic corner that many practitioners would have hoped to talk themselves out of at oral argument. Or to have a chance to convince the Court to allow an amended pleading that clarified that Russell was a plaintiff with standing, or as a co-owner to advance a derivative claim on behalf of M&R.

Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices

The Court issue-spotted, but did not resolve, an interesting question in the Chapter 75 realm. It dismissed Plaintiffs’ trade practices claim because it was “based on precisely the same facts” as underlie the tortious interference, computer trespass, and conversion claims the Court otherwise dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32 (citing Charah, LLC v. Sequoia Servs., LLC, 2020 WL 1903953, at *7 (N.C. Super Ct. Apr. 17, 2020) (“when the UDTP[A] claim rests solely upon other claims . . . which the court determines should be dismissed, the UDTP[A] claim must fail as well.”).

But the Court observed that Defendants’ argument that the Chapter 75 should also be barred by the “learned profession” exemption raised a “serious question.” Id. ¶ 30. See N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b). Plaintiffs contended that Defendants violated Chapter 75 by “obscuring, concealing, and misrepresenting ‘the true nature of their behavior to steal the Plaintiff’s Raleigh family law practice, and all its related assets.’” Id. ¶ 26.  But the question of whether Defendants’ alleged conduct involved the “rendering of legal services to another” that is “often carried out by law firms or attorneys” would have to await another day for clarity.  Id. ¶ 30 (quoting In re Se. Eye Ctr.-Pending Matters, 2019 WL 2051336, at *180-81 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 7, 2019); Reid v. Ayers, 138 N.C. App. 261, 266 (2000)). The Court declined to consider the argument because it was raised for the first time in a reply brief. BCR 7.7.

Worth Noting

  •  The Court reaffirmed its prior ruling that electronic documents can be the basis for a conversion claim. But also reminded that no conversion claim lies where “retention by a wrongdoer of an electronic copy . . . does not deprive the original owner of access to the same[.]” Id. ¶ 47.

Brad Risinger is a partner in the Raleigh office of Fox Rothschild LLP.